

**COMMISSION ON
THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES**

**HEARING ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO
THE NATIONAL GUARD**

9:00 A.M. SESSION

WITNESS:

**GENERAL H. STEVEN BLUM,
CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU**

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ARNOLD L. PUNARO: The commission will come to order. Welcome to the 8th set of public hearings of the independent Commission on the National Guard and Reserve. The commission is chartered by Congress to identify and recommend changes in law and policy to ensure that the National Guard and Reserves are tasked, organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the national security requirements of our nation now and in the future.

Congress expanded the commission's charter in Section 529 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007, directing the commission to report not later than March the 1st, 2007, on the advisability and feasibility of implementing the provisions of S-2658 in H.R. 5200, the proposed, quote, "National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006," end quote.

This legislation would increase the responsibilities of the National Guard Bureau within the Department of Defense; make the chief of the National Guard Bureau a member of the joint chiefs of staff; expand the role of the chief of the National Guard Bureau, and increase the rank of the chief to four-star general; give the National Guard Bureau more influence in the Pentagon's planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process; and create a separate budget for the National Guard for training and equipment of civil support programs and activities; and elevate the role of the National Guard Bureau in responding to domestic crises.

Two points: This legislation, the titles I gave were for 2006. The proponents, the sponsors to that legislation have reintroduced it again yesterday, so it is, again, pending in the Congress, and it's an act of 2007 now. We're going to – fundamentally, it looked to me like it was pretty much the same, but we want to make sure we understand there may be some elements in there, and we would like to get your views on the new elements, if any, as well, at least in the next couple of days, if not this morning.

So in fulfilling the mandate to look at this legislation, again reintroduced, the commission is seeking information from a wide variety of witnesses in order to get as complete an understanding as possible of the pros and cons of each provision of the bill as reintroduced.

In December, we held five hearing sessions receiving testimony from the senior DOD leadership: undersecretary for personnel and readiness, Dr. David Chu, and assistant secretary for reserve affairs, Tom Hall; the senior department of homeland security leadership: the undersecretary of DHS for preparedness, George Foresman – the office over there that is responsible for the national federal emergency response plan; the senior Army leadership chief of staff – General Peter Schoomaker testified – and the senior Air Force leadership: secretary of the Air Force, Michael Wynne, and chief of staff, General Michael Moseley.

And we had a panel of proponents of the legislation, three very distinguished and accomplished adjutant generals recommending, at our request to the sponsors, who they would like to have testify on behalf of the legislation. So the people that they recommended are the ones we called, and they testified as well. Of course the commission has been up and running for over a year, and so we have been looking at a lot of these issues longer than just the last couple of months.

So our three witnesses today will help complete the record. In addition to the eight hearings we would have had on this legislation, we are also incorporating other stakeholder written responses requested by the commission into the hearing record, including the January 26, 2007 letter from North Carolina Governor Mike Easley, and South Carolina Governor Mark Sanford, the lead governors on the National Guard for the National Governors Association. The governors have offered principles to guide the nation's effort to enhance the National Guard, which will be very helpful in the commission's deliberation. Without objection, their letter will be entered into the record. I will tell you, General Blum – no surprise to you – the National Governors Association and the governors most associated with the guard and with homeland defense have been tremendously cooperative and helpful, and we have a very good two-way report going with them, and we look forward to working very closely with them as we come to some of our final deliberations.

So our first witness this morning will be Lieutenant General Steve Blum, chief of the National Guard Bureau. He will be followed by Secretary of the Army Fran Harvey and then chairman of the joint chiefs, General Peter Pace will be our final witness this afternoon.

General Blum, it's a pleasure to welcome you back to the commission. And also, on behalf of the entire commission, I want to extend our congratulations to you on your Senate confirmation last Friday of an extension, a well-deserved extension of your term as chief. You have truly served with distinction during some very challenging times for our nation. We also appreciate the tremendous cooperation that we have received from you and your staff, your very capable staff, many of whom are here today, and all of the things you have done to make our work, and support us in the field, our various visits. So we appreciate that.

Your November 30, 2006 letter regarding the provisions of the National Guard Empowerment Act was made a part of last month's hearing record, and we also appreciate it – we appreciate it when we write to the executive branch and they actually answer the questions, as you did in your letter. That isn't the case with all of our communications.

Many of the provisions of this legislation focus on the structure and authority of the National Guard Bureau. As the current chief, you can offer us the benefit of both your experience and your inside-the-building expertise on the problems, as well as your

tremendous combat record in the field, the problems that this legislation seeks to address and the best way to deal with those problems, including alternative approaches.

The commission's December hearing helped define a number of issues, including what structures improve rather than impede total-force integration, how do you best enhance the guard's role in fulfilling its dual mission in homeland security and domestic crisis response, while meeting the Title 10 requirements of the Army and Air Force around the world. Who should define the requirements for civil support?

As you know, this is a very murky issue, and everybody is kind of pointing fingers at each other saying – thought it was his job, thought it was your job, DHS. And so we are very frustrated on the commission, General Blum, because we don't feel anybody is really developing these important requirements. And as you know, if you don't have a validated requirement, it's awful hard to get funding and budgeting and planning and training and things of that nature. So that is a real hole that we have got to fill.

Are changes needed in DOD's planning, programming, budgeting, and execution system to ensure that the guard's dual mission is adequately resourced? And what role should the nation's governors play in the decision process, as they certainly should have a very prominent role in that.

So thank you, again, for your second appearance before the commission and providing your considerable experience and expertise. We look forward to your testimony. And without objection, your prepared statement will be included in the record. General Blum.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL H. STEVEN BLUM: Well, thanks Chairman Punaro, members of the commission. And let me say right out front, I really appreciate and sincerely appreciate the thorough look that you are giving the National Guard for some possible reforms because clearly in my mind, the National Guard today is not the National Guard I joined, and it's not your older brother's National Guard, and it's not the National Guard that existed on September the 10th, 2001.

So in the last five-and-a-half years, the National Guard has made a dramatic transformation that has identified some significant gaps between the way we were established in 1947, the last time anyone seriously did any significant reform on the National Guard, and today. Very little exists today that matches what was established in 1947, except for our Constitution. Almost everything else has changed in the world, and it's time for the Guard to change and be adaptive to those modern realities.

So thanks again for the opportunity to testify today. You have already alluded to my letter that I sent to you early November. You need to know that represents my personal views and my professional views. I don't have two views. (Scattered laughter.) You asked the question, I gave you the answer. And the answer is clear and in writing, and if there is any elaboration needed on there, I would be glad to address it. But there

won't be any deviation today from what I answered you on the 30th of November. I reread that before I came here today, and I'm solid behind those answers.

In my written testimony, it's almost 8 pages long – it took that long to document the reform and the transformation and the change that the National Guard has made just in the last five-and-a-half years. I spend very little time on the previous 360 years, and we just talked about the recent history of the Guard and why it needs to change. It included the early establishment of the National Guard as a joint bureau in the emergent and recent years of joint programs such as the counter-drug program, which leverages the Army and the Air National Guard, and the state partnership programs, which is absolutely essential to developing partnership capacity around the world for our geographic combatant commanders, CENTCOM, EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, PACOM.

And ultimately in the future, every single one of those combatant commanders relies very heavily on the guard's state partnership to execute their theater, security, cooperation, and their security contacts, and to develop partnerships around the world. That program has existed for 15 years, was started by the EUCOM commander then, General George Joulwan. It started off with 18 countries; today it's 55, and we expect it to increase to 65 or 70 within the next 18 months based on the demand of the combatant commanders.

The civil support teams that were fielded several years ago were invaluable and we want to deploy every single day in your home states and in your zip codes. There is not a single day, not one single day in the last four years as chief of the National Guard Bureau that a civil support team did not role out in support to identify, detect, and advise, and establish communications for either some foreign substance or some hazardous material, a derailed train, chemical incident or terrorist act, or supposed, or suspected terrorist act. It has kept the American people's psyche calm, and I think that the new battle space of our homeland has been dramatically assisted by the civil support teams.

In addition, the CBRNE enhanced response force packages remain today almost six years after 9/11, with the exception of the Marine sea berth (?), the only capability this nation has to call on today, now, that is trained, ready, and equipped to respond to WMD, mass casualties, mass decontamination, search and rescue, and general security operations. And a couple of the CSTs and the CBRNE and joint enhanced force packages, your National Guard is making a very significant contribution to the defense here in a new battle space called the homeland.

The testimony also covered the dramatic expansion of the joint operational missions being conducted inside the United States by your joint National Guard forces. These operations have been executed under Title 32. Just to remind everybody, that means it's federal money, it's federal authority, and it's state command and control. The governors keep control of their National Guard, both Army and Air, but it is vetted through the joint staff, and it is funded by the federal government, and it's authorized by the secretary of Defense.

And it truly is the living reality of what our founding fathers had intended: shared responsibilities and authorities between the state and the local and the federal government when it comes to protecting our citizens. We all have an obligation in that, and that gets to your earlier question: Do the governors have a role in this? If it's going to happen in something called the United States of America, the governors have a role in it. And anyone who would unwisely try to eliminate that from that role will find out just how much of a role they really feel they do have in that.

The command and control that I talked about that has been under the governors has been proven to be a successful model. The first time we used it was right after 9/11 when we put National Guard citizen soldiers and airmen under the control of their governor, federally funded by the United States government Department of Defense so that we could have some way of reassuring the American people that it was safe to fly in our airports and commercial transportation again.

You may remember, just after 9/11, the National Guard, in fact, was put under Title 32 under the operational command and control of the governors in each state to protect our airports until the Department of Homeland Security could stand up to the transportation security administration and identify, recruit, and train, and equip people. As those TSA agents were found and trained, and equipped, and put on station, the National Guard was stood down and was reassigned to other missions.

Currently this morning, there are 6,000 National Guardsman in a similar construct on Southwest border under the command and control of the governors of California, and Arizona, and New Mexico, and Texas on our Southwest border. And they are conducting a federal mission vetted and authorized by the secretary of Defense, and the president, but the troops are under the command and controls of the governor, and it is completely funded by the Department of Defense called Operation Jumpstart. And that is a military support to civilian federal law enforcement border patrol. And as the border patrol stands up its new technology, its new sensors, its barriers and fences, and its additional 8,000 agents in the next two years, the National Guard will stand down from that operation and be remission to whatever the next opportunity might be.

And you know that in Katrina, the largest, fastest, humanitarian aid response operation conducted by any military organization in the history of the United States and the history of the world was done by 50,000 Army and Air National Guardsman by mutual consent of the governors. They came from every single state in every territory in our nation to come to the aid of stricken Americans in Louisiana and Mississippi, and we generated 50,000 Army and Air National Guardsman in six-and-a-half days. That is the largest, fastest military operation in response to humanitarian relief effort in the history of the world. And that was done in Title 32. So that worked out pretty well as well.

So I think that title – operational Title 32, using your National Guard as part of the Department of Defense in a way where it protected the Title 10, Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine force, so that they cannot be diminished in their capabilities and their capacities to conduct operations overseas I think is a very, very wise decision on the part

of our president and two secretaries of Defense that have now authorized this. I hope that this historical overview will help in this commission as it endeavors to do its work, and I look forward to answering your questions, and I would ask that the written statement be incorporated in the record.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you, General. I want to focus – now, I noticed you brought some charts. Were you going to brief your charts, or were you going to use those in answers to questions.

GEN. BLUM: I anticipate that I'll get asked some questions where the charts will probably tell the story better than me trying to talk a lot.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, I want to focus my initial questions on two things. One, I think it's very important we try to get some coming understanding and agreement on the problems that we are trying to solve. And this is – we're asking all of the witnesses – I'll ask our two subsequent witnesses the same question today.

So the sponsors of the legislation – and I have said it at almost every hearing that it is important for people to understand the sponsors of this legislation are not critics of the Pentagon. These are some of the Pentagon's staunchest and strongest supporters. They have been over years. It's bipartisan. So they are coming at this from the perspective of strengthening our national defense, not being critics of the Pentagon. And I think sometimes the executive branches loses a little sight of that.

So they believe that when we're asking more of the National Guard both at home and abroad, its effect in this is happened by Cold War structures and the lack of institutional power within the Pentagon commensurate with its ever-more important role. And as evidence, the proponents site that, and I'm not suggesting that the way I'm going to praise this problem set is something – this is kind of our wording of what we believe the problem set is, but I want to phrase it to you and see if you agree or disagree.

The first one would be that the Department of Defense and the parent services of the National Guard have not adapted to the significant role of the National Guard or the post-9/11 security environment. Agree or disagree?

GEN. BLUM: It's not that easy. I can't agree entirely and I can't disagree entirely. There has been some adaptation, but not near enough. I think that would be a fair way to answer it.

MR. PUNARO: So you're saying that based on particularly some of the material you cited this morning, which has significantly changed, that the department has not adapted to the changes that have been – the requirements you have been forced to meet. Is that correct?

GEN. BLUM: Mr. Chairman, which department are you talking about?

MR. PUNARO: The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.

GEN. BLUM: Okay, both departments are adapting. The Department of Defense has made some adaptations. But the issue, frankly, is that the adaptations have not been formalized in any policy or instruction or regulation or legislation. It is hit-and-miss and it's ad-hoc, but they are clearly adapting; there is no question about that.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, decision – the next problem set. Decision-making processes within the Department of Defense do not adequately consider the interests of the National Guard and do not have National Guard participation and input at the appropriate level?

GEN. BLUM: There are occasions where that is absolutely a true statement. There are also times where that would not be true, and therein lies the problem. There is not a formal arrangement, organization, that addresses, for example, the magnificent contributions the guard has made in operation Title 32 or the use of Title 32 in an operational manner, which is much different than it was used in previous years. You would not have had Katrina happen without it. I'm not talking about the hurricane; I'm talking about the response. You would not have been able to use the guard and satisfy the governors in the utilization of the guard post-9/11 in such a fast and effective manner without Title 32. You would not have been able to conduct the operations on the border today that you see being conducted in Operation Jumpstart without Title 32. The president had a clear dilemma, and the governors had a very clear understanding on how they wanted that done to operation 32 – provided the bridge between the White House and the statehouses around the nation.

We saw the same thing on our northern border with Winter Freeze, and we saw the exact same thing happen in every state where a national special security event has been conducted since 9/11, such as the G8 summit in Georgia, where the National Guard was dual-hatted. And the governor was the commander-in-chief of all of the forces to include the Navy forces at sea that supported the G8 summit on Sea Island, Georgia. All of those forces, Title 10 and Title 32 – Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine and Coast Guard were all in support of a lead federal agency, which was the Secret Service and the FBI. And ultimately, we're working for the president. So it was a magnificent arrangement. None of that was possible before without Title 32.

Now, the issue is that nobody in the department has responsibility for Title 32, but the chief of the National Guard Bureau. The Department of the Army does not have a responsibility in Title 32. It's the Bureau was established to in fact do that job, and the same for the Air National Guard when it's used in 32.

MR. PUNARO: Let me see then –

GEN. BLUM: I hope that helps. I hope that didn't muddy up the water.

MR. PUNARO: It did muddy up the water. So I'm going to try and see if we can get it a little bit clearer. I mean, I understand it's complex and I understand. But so do you believe then – because you basically say that – the way I read it is you believe then that those two problem set statements by the proponents is overstating the extent of the problem, yes or no?

GEN. BLUM: No, I wouldn't say it's overstating. I think they have identified gaps and seams and disconnects that clearly exist today.

MR. PUNARO: And you would want to have those fixed; you would want to have those problems fixed.

GEN. BLUM: Absolutely. The American people need them fixed.

MR. PUNARO: All right. So let me go to the last articulation of the problem set. DOD's failure to appropriately consider National Guard interest in funding requirements has produced a National Guard that is not fully ready to meet current and emerging missions.

GEN. BLUM: Are you asking me to comment on that?

MR. PUNARO: Yes, sir.

GEN. BLUM: It's a fact.

MR. PUNARO: So you agree with that?

GEN. BLUM: That's a fact. I mean, 88 percent of the units – let me clarify that, because there are people here –

MR. PUNARO: A yes answer is fine.

GEN. BLUM: It's a fact. Yes, it is a fact.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, let me go to my next question.

GEN. BLUM: But it would be useful, seriously. The units that are overseas are magnificently equipped. You can't tell the difference – active, guard, reserve – overseas by their equipment. You can't tell by their training. You can't tell by their leadership. And you can't tell by their performance. That is a great success story for this nation. And frankly, it is probably counterintuitive to many members of your commission. By their previous history and their previous life experience, they would not have expected what I just said to be absolutely a true statement. But it is a true statement.

However, having said that, 88 percent of the forces that are back here in the United States are very poorly equipped today in the Army National Guard. And in the

Air National Guard, for the last three decades, they have never had a unit below C2 in equipment readiness.

MR. PUNARO: And those units could be needed here at home, correct?

GEN. BLUM: And today – say again?

MR. PUNARO: Those units could be needed here at home?

GEN. BLUM: Those units are needed here at home and they're leveraged every day.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, so you basically then – let me see if I summarize it, because I don't want to put words in your mouth. But I want to kind of get to the bottom line. You do believe that the proponents of this legislation have articulated some real and serious problems that need to be fixed.

GEN. BLUM: Yes, sir, I do.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, the next area – and this, I know, sort of puts you on the spot a little bit – but let's talk about this issue of being a member of the Joint Chiefs and the four-star and things like that. And let's kind of back away and really focus on the issue of the duties and responsibilities, because a lot of people don't understand the issues with three and four star. The highest permanent grade in our military is major general. And one stars and two stars are held by promotion boards, but to be a three or four star flag officer or general in our military, it's related to the president through the secretary of Defense and the Congress designating that position as a position of importance and responsibility. And each of those jobs has certain criteria, certain duties, certain responsibilities for which the judgment is made that it should be held by an individual of the appropriate rank.

And there is a lot of myth about all this out there, and again, without going into a history lesson, I'd like to get your opinion on two things – your professional military judgment, your personal views. Take yourself out of the situation. Let's talk about your successor down the road when your tenure is up. How would you evaluate the qualifications of our senior leadership in the Guard and Reserve today in terms of whether or not they're qualified to serve in the rank of general. And then, how would you evaluate the duties of the chief of the National Guard Bureau in terms of do they warrant this designation as a position of importance and responsibility, and how does that duty stack up against some of the other four-star billets that we have in our military?

GEN. BLUM: Well, first of all, whether a position is given three stars or four stars, really the only one thing that ought to determine that frankly is the scope and responsibility of the job. And the scope and the responsibility of the job clearly warrants that in my view.

Now, you ask me to comment on the qualifications –

MR. PUNARO: Well, maybe could you articulate a little bit on why you believe it warrants it. I know I've put you in the spot, and I'm saying talk about your successor.

GEN. BLUM: I think this commission should ask to examine closely the answer in my record on 30 November. And in three or four paragraphs, I think I pretty well concisely laid out all of the responsibilities and the scope that are required by the current holder of the position of chief of the National Guard Bureau or any future chief who is going to have more on their plate than I have today. The role and the responsibility of the National Guard is not going to diminish in the future; it's going to increase. The use of the National Guard has been increasing every day in the last six and a half years. I don't see any end in sight. Our contribution to the overseas war fight is significant. It averages 60,000 citizen soldiers and airmen on any given day over the last six and a half years deployed overseas. There are times where over half the combat force of the United States Army on the ground fighting the war were coming out of combat formations of the National Guard.

I'm telling you, there's people on your own commission that would have thought that was an impossible statement as recently as four years ago. So it is a different world. We're looking at a much different situation. Of those of you that are trying to decide whether the chief of the bureau as you knew it in the past required that, can make your own judgment on it. But I think you need to clearly look at what are the complexities, what are the nuances, what are the authorities – what are the difficulties; what is the scope and authorities of the job and make your own judgment as to whether that needs to be a three or four star. That's not for me to decide. All I'm trying to tell you – if you're asking me does it warrant four star, I'd say yes. When I compare it with other comparable jobs, it is far more complex than other four-star general officers have.

MR. PUNARO: Would you care to name any of those?

GEN. BLUM: Would you like me to give some examples?

MR. PUNARO: Yes, I would.

GEN. BLUM: I would say that the role and the responsibility of the chief of the National Guard Bureau in terms of budget and nearly half a million people, which is more than all of the other reserve components added together, which is larger than the Marine Corps almost by double. So I'm not saying that the current four stars don't warrant their position, but I'm saying that to say that the commandant of the Coast Guard warrants a four star, but someone with an organization that has 460,000 or more citizen soldiers and airmen, that has a full spectrum of operations from defending the homeland to providing forces for the Army and Navy overseas at a rate of 60,000 or more on any given day for the indefinite future, and with the new added responsibility of preparing the individual soldiers, equipping and certifying in pre-mobilization so that we can get more time out of them when they are mobilized has clearly more complexities associated with

it; 54 governors over 300 general officers to manage; 54 adjutants general, and a full spectrum of operations both in the homeland and overseas in all of those different venues – I think it's quite complex and certainly is more complicated than perhaps running AMC, for example, and the material command, which leads me to my next answer.

You asked me if the serving three-star generals I know are capable of being four stars? Absolutely. Jack Stoltz (sp) could walk into AMC tomorrow, and I have no qualms whatsoever about seeing him promoted to a four-star general officer and doing a very fine job in that. As a matter of fact, his experience level in civilian life and in the military exceeds many of the people that have held the position of AMC commander as far as professional military experience to do that job. I would also tell you I only know nine serving three stars in the reserve components. And I'm trying very hard to think which one could not be capable of going to four stars, and frankly I fall short, because each and every one of your current reserve chiefs has the potential, in my view, to operate, given the opportunity, at the four-star level.

MR. PUNARO: So you don't buy the suggestion by some that we don't have anybody serving in the ranks of the Guard and Reserve today that is qualified to be considered.

GEN. BLUM: Anybody that holds that position is either biased, prejudiced, not objective, or a victim of their past.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, thank you very much, General.

Commissioner Ball?

WILLIAM L. BALL III: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to turn, if I may, General Blum, back to the legislation that is the subject of your letter that you have referred to, which the chairman mentioned was reintroduced, at least in the Senate, yesterday. You have given us your opinion on certain specific remedies that are set forth in this legislation, and they cover a fairly wide range of reporting requirements, the generation of a new annual plan, integration at NORTHCOM, joint duty credit for senior officers, and promotion procedures, in addition to the matter of the four star position and membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the chief of the National Guard Bureau.

Could you elaborate a little bit in terms of these other specific remedies, setting aside the four-star position, that are addressed in the legislation, and cite any areas among these specific sections that are, in your view, more important than others. And then, the other thing I would ask is if there are any pitfalls or areas that are covered by the scope of this legislation that you strongly feel should not be implemented? I want to get your comments, if I may, on those two dimensions of it.

GEN. BLUM: Well, Mr. Ball, that's a lot of questions hidden in those questions. Let me tell you what I would rather not do here today – in fact, I'm not going to do. I'm not going to grade the Congress' paper. I didn't help write that legislation. I know that

they see significant gaps and understand that they are frustrated with the disconnects and the failure at times of the departments to have a clear understanding or a need or articulate a requirement for some of the equities that are in the reserve component, specifically the National Guard. So I'd rather not do that. But I will answer direct questions, for instance, membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I answered that question in my letter of 30 November, and I said that there are ways to do that without membership per se. There clearly needs – and I think when the chairman comes in to testify today, General Pace, you may want to ask him that question, and I think that he will tell you that there are clearly times where he absolutely seeks and wants the input from the chief of the National Guard Bureau specifically on National Guard matters, because as well as the Army represents the National Guard in the Title 10 arena and the Air Force represents the Air National Guard in the Title 10 arena, and as much as I respect and admire both of the current serving chiefs and the secretaries – and my relationship with both of them is very, very good – there are things that are unique about the National Guard that they have absolutely no experience and deep basis of knowledge about, and that my input as the chief brings the collective experience and positions of the 54 adjutants general and governors and brings it to them in a way that they can't get it from, frankly, the chief of staff of the Army or the Secretary of the Army.

There will be others that have a different view than that. But I'm giving you my honest view. And I think if that question were asked to Chairman Pace, he would tell you the same.

Can I have Chart 1, because that would be helpful here to explain why we have an arrangement that doesn't allow for that? Can you get that to where they can see it?

This shows you the National Guard Bureau as it is currently authorized and has been authorized since 1947, sixty years ago. And you can see what this does and what it doesn't do. And it does certain things very well, and I want this commission to be very, very certain that you understand it is my position that you should not change in any way or diminish in any way the current relationship between the National Guard Bureau – a joint bureau established in law – and the Department of the Army and the Army National Guard, and the Department of the Air Force and the Air National Guard. That needs to remain as it is and to be strengthened.

But it does not need to be the totality of the authorities in how the National Guard Bureau operates and is organized, because this construct does not address these things at the bottom – the informal roles, relationships, and resource processes that are required to construct essential Title 10 joint non-war fight homeland defense, homeland security, state and domestic operations. And it certainly doesn't address Title 32.

And I don't want this commission to be trapped and led to the easy conclusion that, well, you separate Title 10 and you separate Title 32 and it's very easy. You don't want to do that; they blend. And you need to be able to move from Title 32 to 10 and

back, because in many, many events, the forces will go out in Title 32 and then transition to Title 10, and then transition back to Title 32, and then transition back to state active duty. And if you put a red line up or a firewall between the two of them, you are making the secretary of Defense and the president and the governors of this nation have an obstacle course to negotiate at the worst possible time. You should be removing those obstacles. That is what this commission should be doing, in my view. Okay, that's just my humble view of that.

The second piece to this would be useful – show chart two. That oval that we just showed you really only addresses the green oval on this chart. But the real world we're operating in is that big purple bubble plus that green oval. So that oval that we just showed you really only gets to this. And it doesn't even adequately address the half of this green that drifts down to homeland defense. And that's why I tell you 32 and 10 need to blend seamlessly. They don't need to be firewalled. As a matter of fact, the more you throw up some firewalls, the more difficult your job becomes and the more difficult the job of any military responder will become when they're needed. So you can see all of the things that happen there that are not addressed in that first oval.

Now, let me show you what happened with Goldwater-Nichols. We established a Joint National Guard Bureau in 1947, and then Goldwater-Nichols comes along in 1986 and the National Guard wasn't recognized as a joint bureau that it had been since 1958 when the '47 legislation was revised, nor was it accorded joint duty experience, nor was it given joint duty credit, and it wasn't allowed to have the opportunity for joint education and training, and it wasn't allowed to have joint personnel management status. So the formal joint roles, relationships, and resources process were never established. Goldwater-Nichols jumped over the National Guard like it was a speed bump and it did the rest of the reserve component as well, because frankly, they didn't take us seriously, Arnold.

They did not take us seriously, Mr. Chairman. Because in those days, the National Guard isn't the National Guard we're talking about today. The National Guard was one weekend a month, and it was going in the last innings of World War III. And we were going to under-equip it deliberately; we were going to under-resource it deliberately; we were going to under-man it deliberately; and we weren't going to train it too terribly well either, because we didn't take it serious. It was just supposed to be a deterrent force against the Soviet Union.

Now, we're not in that kind of a National Guard. Show me post-September 11. I'm not even going to talk about old history; 1986 is old history. I'm talking about what's happened in the last five and a half years. The National Guard in the last five and a half years under Title 10, under Title 32, and under state active duty has done all of these things in combination. And all of these things were absolutely essential. Airport security in 2001 – (inaudible) – guarding our skies post-9/11; more national special security events in 2004 alone. Katrina and Rita in 2005; Operation Jump Start on the Southwest Border; all the while, while we were going INCONUS – that means in the United States counter-drug operations on the Southwest Border and in 54 states and

territories in support of law enforcement. OCONUS humanitarian operations; OCONUS counter-narcotics programs that we're conducting right now in very critical nations that are very necessary in our fight on the war on terror in Afghanistan – all of the 'stans, the northern 'stans that border Afghanistan, we have counter-narcotics efforts going on. Who is leading that right now – your National Guard. People don't even understand and realize that. And your state partnership program expanded from 18 Soviet satellite states to 55 sovereign nations, and it's going to expand by another probably 20 percent in the next year and a half, as I told you earlier.

So the National Guard has routinely conducted combined interagency and intergovernmental operations at the request of the president of the United States. We didn't self-generate; the president asked us to do this. The secretary of Defense asked us to do this. The governors have asked us to do this. And the combatant commanders have asked us to do this. None of this was self-licking ice cream cones that we made for ourselves. We were asked to do it and we responded.

The National Guard and the Guard Bureau enables NORTHCOM, frankly, and other combatant commands to accomplish their missions. So when you take this into account – put up slide five. Now, you see what is wrong with this oval. Everything was right with this oval in here. When General Keane was the vice of the Army, and General Shinseki was the chief of staff, it was the first time the United States Army became one army. And when you were over there, Secretary Brown, that was the beginning of the future of what's going on right now, and the same thing for Air Force starting about 30 years ago. But none of this addresses this.

So what I'm proposing that this commission take on – put up the next slide, please – slide six. And this will be my last slide unless you need to go back to them. I'm suggesting that this commission look at something that allows this to remain intact, but addresses bringing this into that oval in a way that makes some sense. As you put those two ovals together, you ask yourself does that general officer work or not?

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Ball, you probably ought to – we won't charge – I think that was a very extremely important presentation. But you should have some time to ask a couple of additional questions. And I think, General Blum, we certainly will strap on that challenge.

GEN. BLUM: Well, there's just one last thing I'd like to show you, which may be helpful. Put the last one up there. Because this will show you why you don't want to firewall Title 10 and Title 32. There is the continuity of operations. And you notice, you can't de-link them. This chart wasn't really designed for the purpose that I'm using it today, but it illustrates the point. Do you see the arms band, which is our national military strategy, and the grey band? And you see the governors' equities and how they're interlaced? You've got to be careful that we don't make this separate but equal. This has got to be fully integrated. If it's going to serve the American people well and serve the Department of Homeland Security and serve two very, very critical people, the president of the United States and the governors of our states. This allows for that. And

anybody that would do something that would complicate that would not be, in my view, being helpful to defending the nation both here at home or overseas.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you.

Commissioner Ball?

MR. BALL: Thanks, General Blum. I think those are very helpful charts. And I know the commissioners would like to have a chance to study them in further detail.

MR. PUNARO: And I know that Jane Mathias (sp) is going to get us copies immediately.

MR. BALL: If I could just probe the one point on the continuity of operations. I think the way you've laid that out points to the fact that your bureau faces integration issues seldom seen in government, much less faced by any other component of the armed forces. On the specific point of integration with NORTHCOM, which you mentioned, I think, on chart four, that matter is addressed in the legislation as well with a mandate that the deputy commander of NORTHCOM be a National Guard officer. Can you just comment briefly on the current state of your integration at NORTHCOM? I know some major leaps forward have been made, but that's a question that we on the commission are studying, and find that specific area of integration of vital concern to us, not in the sense of erecting firewalls at all, but in the sense of equipping NORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau with the means to integrate more effectively into the future.

GEN. BLUM: Well, we work at that constantly, but the fact that we have to work that hard at it indicates there is a problem in itself. Admiral Keating and I have an absolutely magnificent professional relationship. But if you were to ask him, if he were to be summoned here and ask the question how much did he know about the National Guard, it would be – particularly when he was very early in his time out there, the answer would have been very close to zero, by his own admission.

Yet, you can't be the commander of Northern Command with the United States in your AOR with the responsibility to defend the land and not have a deep, well synchronized and coordinated relationship with the National Guard, because you have 460,000 forward deployed assets in every state and territory that know the terrain and they know the relationships and they know the special circumstances of geography and politics and everything else that really prevents them from having to exchange business cards in the middle of a crisis. They are critical, critical people. I mean, every combatant commander overseas cries for cultural experts, language experts, indigenous experts. My God, you have them, and it's called the National Guard. Yet we have not optimized that in the relationship with NORTHCOM even yet. We are working on it to improve that every day. But as I said, the fact that we have to work on it four and a half years after the creation of that command is problematic in itself.

MR. BALL: Thank you.

GEN. BLUM: No one has ever suggested that the chief of the National Guard Bureau command a carrier battle group.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner –

LES BROWNLEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. PUNARO: – Brownlee.

MR. BROWNLEE: General Blum, thank you for being here this morning and for your dedicated service. I have known you for some time and observed you when you were forward deployed in Bosnia and Kosovo. And I think that the performance of the National Guard in the war on terror – and not just deployed but the implications at home – and their invaluable service and performance in this is a tribute, not only to your leadership, but of course, I'm sure you would agree, to their dedicated service and willingness to volunteer – thousands of young Americans who have done that in the National Guard. And you represent them here this morning, and so I thank you on their behalf.

GEN. BLUM: Well, sir, you can thank yourself and you can thank General Keane and you can thank General Shinseki, because had you not done what you did when you were there, we couldn't be able to do what we're doing today. And if we had a little more money and put more equipment in, we could be able to do it even better than we're doing.

MR. BROWNLEE: Well, anything I did was quite modest compared to what you've done. But I would like to ask a question, because some witnesses that we've had have asserted that if we adopted the changes – oh, I'm sorry – if we adopted the changes in the proposed legislation that we've been studying the last several months, that it would tend to run counter to the total force concept and the integration of the reserve components and the active components. And everybody has observed how well that has worked, and I'd like to hear your comments on that.

GEN. BLUM: Well, I think the total integration has moved magnificently well, particularly in the last probably ten years. That's probably when it seriously started, and thank God it did or we'd be in trouble right now. We wouldn't have to generate the Army that we generate right now – it's truly one Army: active, guard, and reserve, and civilian. And it's laced together pretty tight. War has a tendency to knock off the nonsense and people aren't checking each other's pedigrees as closely as they used to. They worry about the things that matter. And people that thought the Guard couldn't do combat are seeing the Guard can do combat. We've now sent every single combat formation that exists in our force structure to war. And they have at least that one year boots on the ground, and I haven't had any reports that any of their performances have come up lacking yet in terms of leadership and capability, or courage, or anything else.

As a matter of fact, the biggest surprise seems to be how well they do and how well they do in this very difficult and nuanced phase for operations where you have to be a combat soldier in one minute and a social worker and a mentor in the next. So I think the citizen soldiers bring that civilian-acquired skill and life experience to the battlefield and it's quite useful in that environment. But at the same time, when they've got to kick a door down, they know how to do it, because they were trained very well and equipped superbly by the Department of the Army. And the same thing goes for the Air Force in spades.

So I told you, and I mean it from the bottom of my heart, I would not change the relationship that exists between the Guard Bureau and the Army – Department of Army and the Department of Air Force – but I would not limit the relationship that exists between the Guard Bureau to only the Army and the Air Force, because that shortchanges us on all the rest of the things in those purple ovals that have to be done, and frankly, that the Department of the Army is not concerned with, and it's not on their radar screen. It's not in their job jar. And you know that. Even when you were there, I would come up with some issues and you would say, but this really is not in the Title 10 – train, organize, and equip – of the United States Army's basket. That's true. You're absolutely true and you're absolutely right. But that doesn't mean we shouldn't do it, and it doesn't mean the American people don't expect an organization called the National Guard not to be engaged in that.

So we have to find some mechanism that allows the chief of the National Guard Bureau to keep and maintain and strengthen the relationship he has with the secretaries at Army, Air Force, and the two service chiefs. But at the same time, allow some process where he has a court of redress or another opportunity to talk about the things that don't fall in the train, organize, and equip nice neat stack of the Army or the Air Force.

Now, there's some people suggesting well, what we need to do is have the chief worry about that purple oval, and we just chop out this part of the National Guard and give it to the Army and give this to the Air Force. That would be the most giant step backwards I've ever heard in my life, because now we're stovepiping an operation that was established in law as a joint bureau. It needs to be not only called a joint bureau in law; it needs to be given the tools that a joint bureau needs to work. And I think when you talk to the chairman, you'll find that he will tell you that it is very useful to have the opportunity to get input from the chief of the National Guard Bureau beyond what he gets from the service chiefs vis-à-vis the utilization of the National Guard.

A perfect example is the recent mobilization model that was just passed by the secretary of Defense. That is going to change the Army's training and mobilization model on its ear. But it needed to be. That thing was built for World War II. This is 60 years later, and we're not fighting World War II. We're fighting a much, much different kind of a war and we're using the National Guard in a much different manner. In World War II, the Guard was called up for the duration, and we went to war until it was over. Well, it was over 11 months later, so it wasn't a big problem. Well, not really, because

some units were called up as early as 1941, and fought all the way to 1946, so some of them were on active duty for five years.

If the president wants to call a general mobilization of the National Guard and reserves, we can follow that model. But if we're going to do what we're doing now and use the Guard in rotational basis on the Army force generation model and the Air Force air expeditionary model, then we have to do it in such a way where we can call those people periodically, and we can call them on a predictable manner. And we can call them at such a rate where we can maintain a volunteer force and we don't have to force Capitol Hill to consider things like a draft, which I don't think anybody on this panel thinks is the right answer.

I think the right answer is finding a way to maintain the all-volunteer force and find a way to operationalize the Guard and Reserve, and I think we've found that. And I think Secretary Gates has given the reserve components, particularly the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, exactly the tools they need to do now. Now, that will require shifting some resources and that will require National Guard people like adjutants general to quit grading the Army's paper and start writing it. They'll be part of the people that are writing the paper instead of grading the paper. But they welcome that opportunity, have asked for it, and now they've been given it.

MR. BROWNLEE: Yeah, one of the things, General Blum, that I wanted to get to was you have a relationship with all 50 governors, because of the National Guard forces that are within their states. And of course, they command those forces; they are in charge of those forces when they are in their states.

GEN. BLUM: They are the commander-in-chief of the Guard when it is not in the service of the president or SECDEF, yes.

MR. BROWNLEE: Yes, and so you have a relationship with them. And it's become increasingly clear that we need some kind of a process so that they feel more involved –

GEN. BLUM: "They" being the governors?

MR. BROWNLEE: Yes, in some of these things. What would you recommend to that? And I'm talking about things, and to some extent, how should they be involved in establishing requirements or programming, budgeting, especially those things that are military support to civilian authorities.

GEN. BLUM: Well, they're clearly full partnerships in the defense of our nation and our ability to exercise our armed forces overseas vis-à-vis the Army and the Air Guard. If the governors had not put politics aside for the last five years – I mean, we've not had one single governor yet, and they have very differing views on the war and how it's conducted. But not one governor has failed to send their troops overseas or even hesitated. They've been magnificent in this. So I think they've earned the right to have

some voice in how we equip the National Guard that is back in their state that they need. For instance, Governor Sibelius has now been to see the troops twice in Iraq. When she came back, her state was snowed in, 60,000 people without power. And she called me. She said, you know, I don't have the engineer equipment and trucks and aviation I need to really take care of my own people right now. And I told you this is a concern. And I said, Governor, we share that concern.

So what we did was we called other governors and we bartered equipment and we moved airplanes from other places. But we lost time, to be frank about it, and time translates to lives. In an emergency, it's all about time. So, while the Pentagon can – and it sounds easy and it works nice, it looks good on PowerPoint, it doesn't work in reality that you have to wait and call somebody to go get the equipment you need.

So the Guard really does – we really do need a strategy that will reequip the National Guard here at home. And it doesn't have to have all of its tanks and all of its artillery and all attack legal systems, but it sure does need command and control, it does need communications, it absolutely needs engineer equipment, and it needs trucks, and it needs general purpose aviation and medical and logistics sustainment, because those are the things that the Guard is asked to do when the governor calls them out to either maintain order to save lives or to restore property or to restore order. And it's also the exact same things that the military's asked to do when they're called out to support a civil authority.

So – and frankly, as you well know from your previous experience, that was not on the radar screen, it really was not a high priority of the Department of the Army, so somebody has to be able to articulate those requirements and argue for those. And I make the case that the chief of the National Guard Bureau is the uniformed person to do that. Now, if the secretary of Defense realizes the contributions the governors make –

(Cross talk.)

MR. BROWNLEE: – programming and budgeting for those, or should those be done within the services?

GEN. BLUM: I would make the argument it should be done within the services. There should be nothing – in a world, if I were king, all of the equipment we have would be Army equipment in the Army units and Air Force equipment in the Air Force units that are suitable to take war – not substitute items that you can rive around on the border with or back here at home, but no combatant commander would allow in theater because it's obsolete, too expensive to operate or they don't have the repair parts for, or it just isn't reliable enough to use in a combat zone.

To me, if it's not reliable to use in a combat zone, it shouldn't be back here in our hands. And the equipment in our hands ought to be exactly the equipment that we need to take with us when we go and leave, when we're there if necessary, and then have it

replenished so that when we get back, we have the equipment to train on and we have the equipment to deliver capabilities with.

And that is very important not only to governors, it's important to adversaries around the world to know that the three hundred and some thousand Army Guardsmen that are still back here at home are a credible deterrent force and will come and visit you and have the capability to do so. And that will make some other people who would miscalculate around the world change their calculus.

MR. BROWNLEE: If I could just say, General Blum, you mentioned some three-star general officers in the reserve components that you thought had the qualities and capabilities to assume some of our four-star positions that are out there. I'd just like you to know I certainly would put you in that category.

GEN. BLUM: Thank you, sir. Knowing you mean it, I will take it as a high compliment. Thanks.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Dawson.

RHETT DAWSON: Thank you Mr. Chairman.

General Blum, welcome, it's always a pleasure to hear your testimony. I've found it very illuminating thus far and I wanted to add my congratulations to you on having your tour of duty extended. I think that's a worthwhile thing. I particularly found illuminating those charts that you provided and I'm looking forward to studying those more closely and hope that Ms. Mathias will get those to us because, as you know –

GEN. BLUM: I can assure you she will. (Chuckles)

(Laughter.)

MR. : I'm sure she will, too.

MR. DAWSON: We're in the middle of our deliberations right now as to how we respond in a timely fashion to the March 1 deadline. And I wanted to follow up on Commissioner Ball's and Commissioner's Brownlee's questions of how you'd do a better job of integrating the Guard into the resource allocation and the processes within the Pentagon and also outside of the Pentagon, as to how you prepare better to do your duties. And one of the – I think I may kind of restrict myself to – looking at my colleagues down to my left here who would like to ask questions, too – to kind of restrict myself to following up on a question I didn't quite hear the answer to that Commissioner Ball posed to you regarding a part of the legislation – as I understand it – has to do with something that would be regarded as out of the box, which is making the chief of the National Guard Bureau the deputy commander of NORTHCOM – I think that was his question. And I don't think I heard you respond other than to say –

GEN. BLUM: I didn't hear that or I would have responded.

MR. DAWSON: That was not –

GEN. BLUM: In my view, that's a terrible idea and I'll tell you why. It would either make him a disloyal deputy at times or it would muzzle the chief of the National Guard Bureau on items and certain subject matter where he should not be muzzled. That would be very tough. To be a deputy commander, you must be loyal to your commander; you've got a chain of command and you can give your input to that commander, but when that decision is made, you better support it – and anybody that was a deputy better be doing that or they shouldn't be the deputy. That's what you sign on for. So, if you're going to be an independent voice and you're going to be able to express and advocate for the National Guard and be the deputy, that would be impossible, in my view.

MR. DAWSON: Ok, well, Commissioner Ball has, as he has done throughout our mutual careers together, corrected me – (laughter) – to tell me that the legislation proposes that the deputy commander be filled by a qualified National Guard officer –

GEN. BLUM: Oh, I wouldn't object greatly –

MR. DAWSON: – grade of lieutenant general.

GEN. BLUM: I wouldn't object to that. Let me elaborate.

(Cross talk.)

MR. DAWSON: Let me just finish my question: Would that be useful to try to do a job of helping the Guard integrate itself into both the budget and resource allocation questions as well as the responsibilities that NORTHCOM has in its area of responsibilities?

GEN. BLUM: If the deputy were a qualified National Guard officer, would that help? I think so; I think it would be helpful. I don't think it would be a cure-all, but it would certainly be a step in the right direction. It would be very nice if someone in the chain of command at the senior level had some deep experience in military support to civil authorities and in inter-agency, inter-governmental matters and, so far it hasn't happened.

MR. DAWSON: Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, Commissioner Eckles.

LARRY K. ECKLES: General Blum, you commented to Commissioner Brownlee's question and talked a little about your role with the governors of the various 54 states and territories. I'd like to expand on that a little bit. Some of the governors, or the governors that expressed concern that their views and interests are not properly

considered in critical departmental decisions that affect them as commander in chief of their respective states, in your estimation, how could we better improve the ability for the governors to weigh in on decisions that directly affect them and their states?

GEN. BLUM: Well, I think – I don't want to be too presumptuous here, but I will make this kind of basic. The governors, I think, have been magnificently supportive of the Department of Defense. And, at times, the department has not always met them halfway – vis-à-vis the recent National Defense Authorization Act has provisions in there that are very offensive to the nation's governors, that were slipped in and they were never forewarned or briefed or asked – they weren't even informed. So, they didn't ask them about it, they didn't consult with them – they didn't even tell them. It had to be discovered.

That doesn't breed confidence and trust that is absolutely necessary in a free nation that's going to share responsibilities and authorities vis-à-vis our Constitution. All of us can cite examples where trust and confidence is best when people consult – now, you don't have to agree – General Keane and I didn't always agree, but he always told me what he was trying to do and what he expected me to do, and then I knew how to behave after that and at least he got my input. Same thing with Secretary Brownlee.

The governors were not afforded that opportunity and they're still stung over it, frankly, and probably rightfully should be.

MR. ECKLES: Do you have any suggestions on how we can fix that?

GEN. BLUM: I think an outreach needs to be made. There's got to be some – you know, you have a National Governor's Association. They do meet on a regular basis; they do have subcommittees; they probably should generate a subcommittee on defense, and that subcommittee on defense would probably be a tremendous tool to any secretary of Defense or even the president to meet with them annually or semi-annually, or when something of significant magnitude comes up like change in legislation that's going to absolutely change their authorities in a time of crisis in their state. Absolutely yes, sir.

MR. ECKLES: Thank you.

That's all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Keane.

JOHN M. KEANE: General Blum – Steve, it's great to see you again and I appreciate you coming back here and being typically direct and frank and very forthright about these issues and doing it publicly.

GEN. BLUM: Thank you, sir.

MR. KEANE: You know, the four-star rank yes or no raises motions plus and minus. And even if you went for the four-star rank, if we don't fix some of these other things, we got a four-star guy with the same problem.

GEN. BLUM: Absolutely. A four-star is not going to be the fix of all the ills – I tried to express to you what I think is broken. There are many things that need to be done in concert with one another to rectify that problem, but they're doable –

MR. KEANE: Let me get to some specifics. When you extend that purple chart down into the – you bring the purple down on that bubble chart – into, you know, your elliptical over-layer, you're saying that you want – and I believe what you're saying to me is that you want some kind of relationship that you do not have formally with the chairman or with the secretary of Defense or both. Is that my interpretation? Is that correct?

GEN. BLUM: Yes, sir, I think you have it exactly and I absolutely believe that is necessary. Otherwise the secretary of Defense – this isn't – frankly, the Empowerment Act is misnamed; it really ought to be the Department of Defense Empowerment Act because what they're suggesting gives the secretary of Defense and the chairman of the joint chiefs some military advice to consider before they make some decisions that are very tough to reverse after they make them and could be better decisions made with better information. And frankly, the present construct does not allow for that kind of input to happen, except by ad-hoc arrangements, strengths of personality and relationships that have been developed, some top cover that's provided that shouldn't have to be. And these things ought to be in a formal kind of a relationship where the secretary of the Air Force and the secretary of the Army and the service chiefs don't think they're being in-run or that they chief of the National Guard Bureau is not being loyal to them.

I think we owe our secretary of Defense the very best and the chief, the chairman, the very best military advice we can give them. And frankly, if the issue is about the National Guard, I think you ought to get the most experienced, responsible person in the National Guard to give that advice – not some surrogate who has never spent a day in the Guard.

MR. KEANE: Who do you work for now?

GEN. BLUM: I work for so many people that it would be tough to list them all. But I'll tell you I primarily work for the president, the secretary of Defense, but in law, I am the official channel of communication between the secretary of the Army and the secretary of the Air Force. And there is no mention of the secretary of Defense in law; there's no mention of the chairman in law; there's no mention of the president in law; there's no mention of any of that.

MR. KEANE: So you may be the only three-star that doesn't have a boss?

(Laughter.)

GEN. BLUM: That's another way to look at it, sir.

MR. KEANE: Well, that's a great position, I would have loved that.

(Laughter.)

GEN. BLUM: Yeah, I'm loving life.

MR. KEANE: Let's go to NORTHCOM. Obviously we have challenges – this is a fledgling new command. They're trying to understand their responsibilities. I think we've had two commanders. One of your recommendations, if I understand in response to Commissioner Ball is, that you would welcome more National Guard presence in that command. Do you want to be more specific about that? Or is there anything else that we should be doing with NORTHCOM that we're not doing?

GEN. BLUM: NORTHCOM and the National Guard are almost – you have to use in the same breath when you're talking about land defense of CONUS or responding to the second part of their mission statement which is consequence management in the United States. You don't have to have the Guard for Mexico; you don't have to have the Guard for Canada, the other part of their OAR, although you could make some significant arguments. But if you're going to – for NORTHCOM to operate within the continental United States and anything that's called a state or territory, you're going to be stepping all over the equities of that governor, if you don't know how to – it's an art and a science to doing that. And yes, you're going to be in charge of the Title 20 military response forces. But I'm maintaining that they ought to have some excellent situational awareness and very close coordination in the Title 32 response.

Because what we're doing on the Southwest border right now – I was the chief of staff for Northern Command when they stood it up and I left there to come here and, in some respects, I'm sorry I did, because we might have been able to set that up a little bit differently had I stayed there a little bit longer and certainly it's set up right now in an almost adversarial problematic way. Now, we're working through that – don't misunderstand that. We're going to make this thing work. But it's taking a heck of a lot of work that doesn't – shouldn't – have to take –

MR. KEANE: Is there anything we should do other than assign more Guard and Reserve officers to NORTHCOM? Is there any other organizational problems beyond the lack of knowledge and experience dealing with these issues? Is there some other fixes that we need from –

GEN. BLUM: Yes, sir, I would try and find a way for the Title 32 force that's going to be called out by the governor and it's going to be insisted by every governor that they command and control their National Guard or retain control of them to the maximum extent possible – now, there are some very specific times and circumstances

where those forces may have to be put into federal service and put in Title 20 and wrested away from the governors.

I can envision some extremist conditions or a governor that is not being cooperative to the total national defense effort where that can happen. If you can remember, that's not unprecedented. Governor Wallace called out his National Guard to enforce segregation under state law and the president called him and said, you're in defiance of the federal law and stand down, and he wouldn't, so they federalized the Alabama National Guard and the very same commanders and soldiers that were enforcing segregation now were escorting young black children into school and protecting them as a Title 20 force.

So, it can be done. And that was a very emotionally charged time and a very contentious issue. So it works. I mean, the system works. You can switch and make them Title 20 when you need them. But NORTHCOM really needs – NORTHCOM's Title 20-centric to a great degree, at their own detriment. Now, I really would rather not turn this hearing into me grading NORTHCOM's paper because that's unfair, number one –

MR. PUNARO: You've done a pretty good job of it.

GEN. BLUM: Well, I'm trying to give you the scene where – (cross talk) – the fault lines are. It's not that we're not working together and trying like heck, but there are some problematic fault lines in there that don't recognize – NORTHCOM, for instance, will not advocate requirements as any COCOM should for the Title 32 piece that the Guard provides for that – so that means that the Army Guard and the Air Guard – and when I come in there and I'm trying to equip or train these CBRNE enhanced response force packages, I run into brick walls when you were there and you were there because they say, well hey, this is not a Title 20 Army thing, we're not going to pay for this. So now we have a capability that the nation is denied because of all of our organizational impediments that we have in the way. And I would say that this commission can do something – could make some suggestions –

MR. KEANE: Let me ask you one more. With the Department of Homeland Security – this is the other major organization that didn't exist in the past – what is your relationship with that department and are there some improvements that we should making to strengthen this relationship so we're more effective?

GEN. BLUM: With which department, sir?

MR. KEANE: The Department of Homeland Security.

GEN. BLUM: It's a very informal relationship. Right now, all I have is LNOs over there and we have to put the LNOs over there at a very second- or third-tier level. There's no flag officers over there by instruction. So, I would think that the National

Guard should have a much closer liaison with them, frankly, because they will be the federal lead agency that we would be in support of in most –

MR. KEANE: So you have nobody in their planning staff?

GEN. BLUM: No.

MR. KEANE: And anybody in their operation center?

GEN. BLUM: No. I have LNOs over there. That's all I'm allowed to send over there right now.

MR. KEANE: Okay. Last question deals with resources. This problem we've had with the Army on resources. And I know the Army is short resources rather significantly in terms of equipping. But you're suggesting it's more than just the fact that we're short resources. If I don't understand, I think what you're saying is, while the Army is short resources, you're disproportionately short resources within the Army. And that needs to be fixed. Do I have it right?

GEN. BLUM: I'll give it to you and you determine that. You know what I have overseas, they're superbly resourced. Eighty-eight percent of those forces that are back here at home are resourced at less than 50 percent of equipment on hand. And if we take out the substitute items, it goes south quick.

MR. KEANE: You're aware that most of the – this is not a classified hearing –

GEN. BLUM: I understand, we are not –

MR. KEANE: – You know what shape the active forces are in back here.

GEN. BLUM: Yes sir. The Army needs more money for equipment. We under-equipped the United States Army for far too long because we didn't think we were going to fight. We're fighting. If we're going to be fighting, we need to equip it, all pieces of it.

MR. KEANE: Ok, let's admit that money will solve some of this problem. But what else do we need to do in this relationship to fix it – is there anything structurally, organizationally, policy-wise that we need to do so that we don't continue to have this problem down the road?

GEN. BLUM: I think that what could be considered – and I'm not going to advocate this right now – but what could be considered is something analogous to the SOCOM model, where unique homeland defense, homeland security mission requirements – I'm talking about money to train, money to resources, to purchase specialized equipment that is needed for that, or equipment that is not recognized in the Department of the Army's priority list, but would be absolutely required for our ability to

provide the capabilities we need in response to a local, state, or national, or regional emergency – WMD, terrorism, or mother nature – the essential ten of the communications, aviation, transportation engineers – if force-special equipment for these CBNRNE enhanced force packages, if there were some way that we could put a marker on the table and compete in the JROC for that, I think that would be useful.

I think representation of the Guard on the JROC would be useful, frankly, because if the Army isn't going to advocate for this and the Air Force is going to advocate less, the Marines are going to advocate not at all for the Guard and the Navy is totally irrelevant to them except for when we work together where the shoreline meets the terra firma – but when you think about it, who's going to advocate for that? Where does that come from? Particularly if NORTHCOM won't recognize the Title 32 requirements. Now, if they would recognize that, then you have a legitimate –

MR. KEANE: Then you have a requirements generation process –

GEN. BLUM: Absolutely. So there's absolutely no place to get that on the table. And then what you're forced to do is to go up on the Hill in a precarious situation and –

MR. KEANE: – and work around the department.

GEN. BLUM: Exactly. And that's not appreciated by anybody. And then we don't appreciate doing it.

MR. KEANE: Okay, well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. PURANO: Thank you.

Commissioner Lewis.

PATRICIA L. LEWIS: Thank you, General Blum. Your testimony is very, very helpful and your charts were extremely valuable. I want to get back to one specific provision of the Empowerment Act and that's the responsibility for developing the charter for the Guard Bureau. And there's a recommendation, as you're well aware, in the Act, and you addressed in your letter to us, changing responsibility for that charter from the current configuration where the secretaries of the Army and the Air Force develop that to elevating that to being the responsibility of the secretary of Defense. You have discussed this morning your relationship with outside entities as well – the president, the Department of Homeland Security, and the lack of real definition in your role and interaction with that agency, and your very broad requirements for interaction with the governors of the states.

Do you feel – please, I won't put words in your mouth, but, share with us, on the record, your feeling about the responsibilities in that charter. Should your recent efforts with pre-event and emergency planning be incorporated in that charter and do you feel it's appropriate for the secretary of Defense or is existing authorizing authority for the

Guard Bureau the appropriate place, and would you recommend any changes in those authorities?

GEN. BLUM: I think the charter should be adjusted to address the habitual and persistent ad-hoc relationships and requirements that have fairly routinely befallen the National Guard Bureau and the relationship with the Department of Defense and the joint staffs. If I'm being too cryptic in that, what I'm trying to say is, we've done a lot of work with them, but it's been all without portfolio. And the charter could provide that portfolio pretty instantly. And that charter should not, and would not, in any way change the existing relationships with the Air Force and the Army – in fact, that could be strengthened actually.

This – I'm being as candid as I can be – I don't view this as empowering the Guard at all. I think this empowers the Department of Defense and the Army and the Air Force to close the gaps that we really didn't even realize existed. A lot of people that work in that building over there don't even know these gaps are there. They're very happy with the way things are and they think they're wonderful. They're not wonderful. They're imperfect.

And I think that a true professional is constantly evaluating our performance and trying to make it better and I think these things would make it better. I think it fosters jointness. The American taxpayer gets more defense for the taxpayer dollar this way. There's less firewalls, stonewalls, obstacles, and more unity of effort that comes out of this. You get a better Army out of it and you get a better Air Force out of it and you get a better National Guard out of it. And you have a much more – you got another arrow in the secretary of Defense's quiver and the governor's quiver and the president's quiver than they have right now.

MS. LEWIS: I appreciate that and I would just ask that – you've been very helpful to us as we've done our review of these issues – and I'd just ask that as we look at specific items that could or should be incorporated in that charter that we could work with you on now.

GEN. BLUM: Absolutely.

MS. LEWIS: Thank you.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you. Commissioner McKinnon.

DAN MCKINNON: General, good to have you with us today. One of the great things about your famous reputation is you're concise, blunt, and got really great answers. I'd just like to sort of close the loop on a few things that have been kicked around here. But one is about Northern Command. You testified that you've got nine generals and three stars and all of them are capable of being a four-star to the best of your knowledge. We've talked about the deputy commander being a Guard person. What about the commander of NORTHCOM? Do you think he should be a Guard person?

GEN. BLUM: I think the person that commands NORTHCOM ought to be the military professional who has the deepest experience in military support to civil authorities, inter-agency response. I would not – I was being a little facetious earlier when I talked about nobody suggested me being a carrier battle group commander – there's a reason for that. I'm not an aviator. I've never been in the Navy. I wouldn't know where the head was on a carrier. I don't think that's the kind of guy you want running a carrier battle group.

I think that's not the – I think you need to put a trained, seasoned, experienced professional at Northern Command because it may be the most nuanced, it may be the most politically charged and less forgiving of all the combatant commands. And that combatant command probably ought to approach its mission more like a JAITF on steroids than a combatant command in the sense that a combatant command is usually viewed overseas, because it is not overseas, it's here in the United States – (chuckles) – and it has deal with something called a Constitution of the United States. No other combatant commander's got to deal with that overseas. They have clear lines of authority and they have much greater latitude.

This is a very nuanced command and the success of that command will be entirely, entirely based on how well that commander can knit the inter-agency and the services, both active Guard and Reserve. And this commission, since it is the Guard and Reserve Commission, you really ought to take a hard look at how you leverage the magnificent Coast Guard Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Army Reserve, so that when our nation is in need, all of that comes together seamlessly and we're not worried about pedigrees and what title you're under.

MR. MCKINNON: Would that be a yes or a no?

GEN. BLUM: Yes.

MR. MCKINNON: Okay, so you've got the concise answer. (Laughter.)

In the interest of time, I've got a few questions here, I want to be sure we try and get some on the record. How important do you feel the reserve policy board is? And are you familiar with any contributions they've made in recent times?

GEN. BLUM: I think it could be very, very important. Of late, it hasn't been very important. It has been minimized in its – you're talking about the RFPB?

MR. MCKINNON: Yeah.

GEN. BLUM: It has been minimized to the point where it is rather ineffective.

MR. MCKINNON: Do you think there's some discussion about the coordination with the governors? What about setting up some kind of policy board for the governors, a small committee –

GEN. BLUM: Hmm, would that be a venue for that?

MR. MCKINNON: – to report directly to the secretary of Defense, with their advice and suggestions? Do you think that would be a good idea? –

GEN. BLUM: Not as it's currently constructed because it's filtered –

MR. PUNARO: I don't think you were talking about through the Reserve Forces Policy Board.

MR. MCKINNON: No, no, I'm switching subjects –

MR. PUNARO: Separate.

MR. MCKINNON: You gave me an answer on reserve policy –

GEN. BLUM: Separate advisory, governor advisor board? Absolutely, absolutely. I think the governors would welcome that. I don't want to speak for them, but my sense is they would welcome something of that arrangement.

MR. MCKINNON: You know, the president and the department recently announced their four initiatives about the conduct of the war, which included basically four things: to increase of the size of the Army to 67,000, the Marine Corps by 25,000. The Army says it's going to cost about \$70 billion to do this. They're talking about surging five brigades, about another 21,500 soldiers; reduce the Army Guard and Reserve mobilization time from 18 months to one year; and deploying organic units instead of cross-leveling. If they can't get the money from the Congress to do that, the active Army, do you imagine they'll take it out of the hide of the Reserves?

GEN. BLUM: I would certainly hope not. They'd be basically cutting off their left arm to help out their right arm. We are part of the Army. We're an essential part of the Army and I think the Army sees that today in a way that it has not seen it any stronger than this in the past. This is amazing times. I mean, this is really wonderful. When you're talking about – it is really one Army. So I would say that the Army needs to grow – includes the Guard and the Reserves – we need to grow with the Army because that's the way they're going to be able to grow. Otherwise, they may not be able to grow to the numbers they need.

So I think Secretary Harvey and General Schoomaker are willing to let all three components of the Army grow and if the Army falls short and the Guard over-executes, we're still all one Army. And that just means that that's where the soldiers will come

from. If the Army can grow and we can't, so be it. And the same thing with the Army Reserves.

So I think we'll need to watch that and manage that. But I think we're all going to come out of the box trying to grow because we're all part of the United States Army. The Congress, frankly, has to fund that if their Army is going to be able to do what the nation has asked it to do historically and what it expects it to do in the future.

MR. MCKINNON: If the Army grows like that, do you feel the Guard and Reserves to mean to be an operational force?

GEN. BLUM: Oh, absolutely. I think it would be a huge mistake to back away from what has finally brought the Army into one Army. The fact that we are an operational force and we are essential really actually achieves General Abram's dream. This is the fulfillment of Abram's doctrine. This war is not popular with the United States. It is a very fragile thread that's holding the American people to this engagement overseas. They don't understand it well and it is painful and it's long. We are not a nation that is great on patience and understanding of these things. But they do understand one thing and that is that if their National Guard and Reserve units go to war, they bring America to the fight. And to take the Guard and Reserve out of the operational force and out of the fight would be a fumble that this country could not recover from. It's taken us almost 40 years to recover from the fumble that we had in Vietnam. We are never going to do that again, I hope.

MR. MCKINNON: Just one last thought here. There's a lot of talk about the possibility about merging the Army Reserves into the National Guard. What's your thoughts about that?

GEN. BLUM: I think there's a clear place for the Army Reserve. They fill a very needed niche. They are very – designed specifically for a niche category. I would like to see the Army Reserve more usefully involved in homeland defense and able to fold up under the joint force headquarters in each state that the governors call out, as well as the Marine Corps Reserve and the other reserve, the Air Force reserve and the Navy reserve, that may be in that state or that territory that's affected. That I would like to see.

But I'm not here advocating the abolition of the United States Army Reserve. There's no need for it. They clearly do things we do not do and we do things that they do not do. But we both do things that the Army absolutely needs us to do. So I'd be very cautious and measured in looking at that.

MR. MCKINNON: In other words, you're opposed to the idea?

GEN. BLUM: I am not sold on the need to do it immediately without really looking at it hard.

MR. MCKINNON: Ok, thank you, General Blum.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you.

Commissioner Rowley.

WADE ROWLEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General Blum, for your testimony this morning. So far it's been excellent and very helpful and I appreciate your candor.

I'd like to talk a little bit about the National Guard and the homeland security mission. As you know, I've spent quite a bit of time at the border and I get to see the Guard troops fairly frequently. It's a great operation. And we hear a lot about DOD's role of providing defense support to civil authority and just to ask, what is your definition of this role? And a second part of this question is, is this definition widely-shared and agreed upon by DOD civilian and military leadership, governors under tags, and other civilian federal agencies?

GEN. BLUM: I appreciate you asking me that question, but I'm going to be honest and tell you I'm not sure I'm qualified to tell you how everybody views that and what they think about that. I will tell you there's a wide opinion of that so that tells you that everybody is not totally in the same frame of mind with that.

My view of defense support to civil authorities is that civil authorities do what civil authorities can do to the maximum extent they can and then when their manpower or equipment or their expertise is stretched to the limit or exhausted or they just don't have that capability and we do have that capability in DOD, I think that it is right and proper that it does not remain on the shelf and untouched. It should be made available to civil authorities to support them in their effort – in their law enforcement to restore law and order or save lives and property. We should in fact do that, and we do that on a fairly routine basis. I cannot think of one day in the last four years that we did not have National Guardsmen out on a support-the-civilian-authority mission in at least – it averages about – it averages about 1,100 soldiers a day that are called out for these kind of things – tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, tsunamis, riots, critical infrastructure protection, snowstorms, dropping hay to animals that are stranded, rescuing people – hikers off of Mount Hood. I mean, it goes on and on and on. We probably do probably the average of about one-and-a-half, two a day, every day around the country.

MR. ROWLEY: Great. Do you believe there is a definitional problem that impedes our ability to properly train and organize the guard to fill these homeland security missions? Is there something that we can recommend or do to better encompass what that role is?

GEN. BLUM: Not for the great bulk of our forces. I think for those that are going to be specifically required to respond as first military responders to civilian first responders, I think we owe it to those young men and women to give them some training and equipment so that they can survive that. That is not a risk-free environment. That is

putting them in harm's way. It's not harm's way in terms of RPGs and bullets flying at them or IEDs – or it might be. It might be in the future, even here in the homeland. But right now while walking into an area that has a biological weapon or a chemical spill or hazardous material thing. I think we owe them the training and the equipment to go into that environment and operate safely and come back safe.

MR. ROWLEY: Thank you very much, General Blum.

GEN. BLUM: Thank you.

MR. ROWLEY: Mr. Chairman.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Sherrard.

JAMES E. SHERRARD III: Good morning, Steve. Just to try to follow up and close the loop on some of the things that you have discussed this morning referencing requirements and resourcing and things of that type. One of the major thrusts of this legislation we are viewing, as you know, is the fact that there has been comments that the National Guard has not been properly resourced for the requirements for the homeland mission. And I guess the question I need to ask with you – I think you started to say it a while ago, but I didn't hear it come out, is who actually sets those requirements and how are they set?

GEN. BLUM: Presently no one.

MR. SHERRARD: No one is doing it. Okay.

GEN. BLUM: I mean presently no one.

MR. SHERRARD: Would there be, as a follow up to another piece of that, there is also legislation – in this legislation proposes that your position, the chief of the National Guard Bureau be the individual or be the entity that in fact would identify gaps between federal and state processes and responses to the homeland mission as well as emergency responses. And I guess I need to ask your opinion, is that appropriate for you, and if it is not, then who should it be?

GEN. BLUM: I think it probably appropriate. I think if I were Admiral Keating, one of the big questions CCIR that he would ask me to provide for him is identify the gaps that exist between the state and local responders in the National Guard. In other words, what should I anticipate in the state of Arkansas? Do I need to bring in there, or is it the same as New York? It isn't. None of these states are the same. They all have different strengths and weaknesses. They all have different gaps and capabilities, and some have tremendous capabilities, and others have none.

And I think that we would play a very useful role for that combatant commander in answering that CCIR. That lets him know what to plan for and what he better be

preparing for because it's probably going to fail there, and know where he doesn't need to address assets or resources because they are very adequate in that area. So I think it's a useful thing, and it's not telling him how to do his business; I'm just providing him some data that he could use to do his, I think, better planning and more realistic planning for how he would respond or reinforce the Title 32 response.

MR. SHERRARD: Okay, and one last question. There has also been discussion about the ability for you and the other reserve component commanders to have access in the budgeting and the planning process. And I just want to – I would like to have it on the record. Do you or were you given the opportunity in various things, whether it be BRAC or force structure decisions – do you have the ability to have a say in that, albeit having heard you said earlier you don't have the ability to discuss Title 32 in the existing PBBS process. Am I correct in saying that you do have the play in all of Title 10 decisions, but if Title 32 were to incorporate into that, that would make life much, much simpler for you?

GEN. BLUM: All right, let me try to take this and give you an honest, concise answer. I am not always considered in the Title 10. I can give you painful examples of recent times where even the United States Air Force has failed to do what it had historically done for two and three decades in including the Guard into their programming budget decisions.

On BRAC, because of the construct of the oval, we were muzzled and sworn to secrecy in BRAC, so we couldn't say what we knew and we couldn't affect anything without the significant sanction. And that's on the low end. I mean, it was – there was a bad deal. And I'm sorry to say, most of the time we are involved in that, but not all of the time, and you can't get called to most of the huddles and play on the team. Okay, you can't play on a football team and you come to huddle for first and third down but you're not there on the fourth or the one huddle and you don't know what the hell the play is, and they expect you to do what you're supposed to do.

So you've got to be there all of them, and that's why it can't be ad hoc. That's why it can't be based on personalities and present relationships. It's got to be formalized so that when you have a meeting on the budget, there's a seat there that says NGB and somebody better be sitting in it or you know somebody either didn't take the time to come or they chose not to come, but at least they were supposed to be there. Too many of these decisions are made with a huddle that they don't count and see if they've got all the players on the field.

So that's as honest as I can be, and I think if you talk to the other RC chiefs – maybe not in open hearing like this, but they'll tell you in private.

MR. SHERRARD: But the important thing is that you need to have that ability, though. And one last follow up of that. Currently under the Title 32 initiative there's no mechanism by which you can take it through the Army or the Air Force. You're just having to do that all yourself.

GEN. BLUM: Absolutely. And you've got two people here with long, deep experience in the Army that can tell you that.

MR. SHERRARD: Okay, thank you very much.

GEN. BLUM: And it just is not – it's not in their job jar.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you.

MR. SHERRARD: Thank you very much.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Stockton.

DONALD L. STOCKTON: Thank you again, General, for being here with us and sharing your expertise and knowledge. We appreciate that very much.

You said early on in your comments about what the American people expect, especially with respect to the homeland, and I guess I'd like to focus for a moment on the interagency cooperation with respect to that. Certainly the National Guard Bureau is very involved in homeland defense and homeland security, as is the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the assistant secretary for Homeland Defense, the White House Office of Homeland Security. All of these have key roles with respect to the homeland.

We know there are obstacles out there about these institutions being able to work together, so how would you suggest that we can improve the interagency process work better to ensure that the National Guard, which you're totally familiar with, that the National Guard capabilities are best utilized to achieve national security objectives?

GEN. BLUM: I am a very big fan of something called JIATF – Joint Interagency Task Force. Just the label breaks down a lot of the barriers, and the label also reminds people who's supposed to be on the team and who has that membership and input to that. If this commission has never visited JIATF South, I would commend you to take a look at it. It is an amazingly efficient and effective organization of the widest eclectic collection of interagency, intergovernmental – to include international – and it all works with superb unity of effort. And you will see partners down there you would not expect to see from nation's you wouldn't expect to see, doing things that you would never imagine that they would do with and for us. And I went down there and looked at that and said, this to me is the kind of mechanism that our nation needs to bring together what you're suggesting.

And does that exist right now? No, it does not. But should it exist? I would – I would offer very strongly that's worth exploring. Somebody ought to look at that real hard. And I really mean that. That's – I think it's a model for success.

MR. STOCKTON: Thank you, General.

GEN. BLUM: Sure.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Stump.

E. GORDON STUMP: I thank you for your testimony, General Blum. I think you've been very enlightening and it's given us a lot of the rationale behind the legislation that we were looking at, and it's been very helpful to us.

In both your written response and in responses earlier today that you indicated that you thought that maybe the chief of the Guard Bureau should be the principal advisor on National Guard missions to the secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Can you give me some examples of when you have actually participated in giving this advice?

GEN. BLUM: Yes, sir. In Katrina – in Hurricane Katrina I met with the chairman, the vice chairman, the deputy, the secretary of Defense, and even on occasions the president of the United States during that time, and the product of that meeting was, as I said earlier, the largest, fastest, most effective military response to a humanitarian assistance mission in the history of the world. So it does produce effective results.

When we were deciding – when the decision was being made for the Southwest border, that same construct again occurred. There have been occasions when PITM-3 (ph) was announced and BRAC was announced and PVD-732 (ph) were announced – these were all labels of very bad days for the National Guard and Reserve component when they were not involved in the budgeting process and resources decisions. Resource decisions in the Pentagon are made at the general officer level. So if you're not there, you're not going to be in on the decision and it's very, very difficult to change a decision. It is much easier to influence a decision before it's made than to get it changed after it's made. Very, very hard to put the toothpaste back in the tube, if you know what I'm talking about.

So that has happened on occasion, but it doesn't happen on every occasion. And that's exactly what I'm talking about. So it's hit and miss. And again, I would ask you to ask General Pace, when he comes in here, what he thinks because I think you will get a surprising answer out of him. And I think it would be surprisingly supportive to what I'm saying, to be honest with you. He sees very – I don't want to put words in his mouth, so I'll let him answer when he gets here, but my perception is that he sees value in having an independent voice and someone that comes from the Guard speak for the Guard on issues that ultimately affect the Guard.

Now, that doesn't mean he has to be dismissive of what the chiefs of the services say, but this is extra information that he can consider before he takes his recommendation forward to the secretary of Defense. So he gets the whole picture. It doesn't mean that we're going to be right all of the time and we're going to be listened to any of the time,

but at least we get heard and at least we have our position added to the thought process, to the decision-making process. And that's, I think, all we're asking for, and I have faith and confidence in the people that run the Department of Defense and who serve on the Joint Chiefs, and particularly the chairman and the vice chairman, and if they get good inputs, total, full disclosure, they will make the right recommendations. And I'll salute and follow those recommendations once they're decided because that's what I'm honor-bound and duty-bound to do.

MR. STUMP: Great. Well, it appears that this legislation is just going to – would just formalize what is already happening and working very well.

GEN. BLUM: In a large extent, that's correct.

MR. STOCKTON: Well, thank you very much for your testimony and we certainly appreciate your candor.

MR. PUNARO: General Blum, let me follow up. I think Commissioner Stump is really on to something here, and your answer is about how it ought to work and is so compelling from a commonsense standpoint, it's almost hard for people to understand why in the world wouldn't the chairman of the Joint Chiefs or the secretary of Defense and the National Command authorities want to get the input from the top expert in terms of the Guard in Title 32, and particularly these kind of situations you've just outlined. And it's so compelling on its face, and in fact is done many times, as you say, already – and I know this is another one of these put-you-on-the-hot seat kind of questions – why is it – and we don't know General Pace's position, so we look forward to hearing from him here this morning – why is it the Department of Defense is so adamant in their opposition to what appears to me to be such a commonsense answer to a problem?

GEN. BLUM: I don't know. I don't know that they are that adamant. I don't –

MR. PUNARO: Well, the witnesses that have testified –

GEN. BLUM: Well, I don't – let me – I don't think the secretary of Defense is adamant against it, and I don't think the chairman of the Joint Chiefs is adamant against it, and I don't think the vice chairman is adamant against it, and if they come in and testify differently, then I'll be wrong.

MR. PUNARO: Yep. So you're saying we probably – you don't believe that Dr. Chu then, in effect, represents the Department of Defense's position?

GEN. BLUM: (Chuckles.) Mr. Chairman, you're not going to put me in that position. (Laughter.)

MR. PUNARO: Okay. I think –

GEN. BLUM: Dr. Chu represents his position. (Laughter.)

MR. PUNARO: Well –

GEN. BLUM: And I respect his –

MR. PUNARO: – he was a witness sent by the Department of Defense to articulate the department's position on this legislation. That's of course why we're hearing from a lot of different witnesses.

GEN. BLUM: Well, Dr. Chu is certainly entitled to his position and his opinion.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, let me – I think we understand this. Let me kind of pick up again on what I thought were some very compelling thoughts that you brought out, and let me see if I can characterize it correctly, not putting words in your mouth, but as you said – the thrust of your testimony, as I heard it here today, what sticks with me is you're looking for ways – first of all, there is agreement that we have some problems that need to be fixed, and you're looking to fix those problems in ways that do several things all at the same time, that really strengthen the institution as opposed to just focusing on one individual. It strengthens the institution of the Guard as well as the institution of the Department of Defense.

It does it by bringing it into the current framework of Goldwater-Nichols, which has been so successful on the Title 10 side of the house, and which is very clear on the face that that legislation did not incorporate the Guard, and you want to do it an integrated fashion and a seamless fashion because, as I heard you say, there really can't be a bright line between Title 10 and Title 32 because there are elements of both –

GEN. BLUM: There can be but it's counterproductive.

MR. PUNARO: It's counterproductive. So have I summarized some of your key thoughts on this?

GEN. BLUM: Yes, Mr. Chairman, you have.

MR. PUNARO: Okay. All right, now let me talk a little bit about this issue of operational. I think there are two questions that the commission said in our 90-day report to the Congress that we needed to pose when it comes to this issue of an operational reserve, and that is, one, is it feasible, and two, is it sustainable, and we've been looking at that almost for over a year, and what you have is the Department of Defense position – and I think you're absolutely correct; I think General Abrams would be extremely pleased with how this has played out. So it's not a question of whether it's the right or the wrong thing to do; you certainly need some elements in the strategic reserve, you certainly are going to always have things in the operational or a combination of both, but I think there really is a question about is it feasible and is it sustainable?

The Department of Defense just declaring this as operational doesn't necessarily make it so. Now, the issue then of if you don't have the proper equipment, if you don't have the proper personnel, you don't have the people trained in the right military occupational skills, you don't have the kind of recruiting and retention you need because of perhaps overuse or under-use, what you're saying is we want to keep the concept of operational, but you're not suggesting that you believe without making some of these fixes that it's sustainable on the current basis that it's on now.

GEN. BLUM: I think you have – it's a very delicate balance that has to be watched carefully and managed. There's a lot of variables on this. I have told the secretary of Defense – and I mean this in every fiber of my being – that I think we can sustain 60,000 soldiers for the war fight overseas from the National Guard indefinitely. That means in perpetuity. As long as the American people support the soldier, we can do that.

Now, the National Guard providing 60,000 soldiers to this fight is – this is significant. We're talking five combat brigades. We're talking all the CS and CS that goes with it. That relieves the active duty force from the need to grow by at least 180,000 soldiers to generate 60,000 soldiers all the time. That's on a very efficient model, and I'd say too efficient, of three to one. There are those that argue it takes four and five to one to do that, but even at three to one, that takes the burden off the Marine Corps and the United States Army to go out and find 160,000 people that fit in – combat support, combat service support, combat units, to include the leadership.

The National Guard today – and this is very important for this commission to think about when you're talking about the Guard. The Guard you're talking about today has 65 percent combat veterans in its ranks today. I'm not talking about guys that went to Desert Storm or Vietnam or Grenada; I'm talking about 65 percent of our young men and women have been to war since 2001, with one year boots on the ground and a contemporary military assignment. We're talking about sergeants, captains, majors, lieutenant colonels, and 30-some general – over 30 general officers have spent one year boots on the ground as a general officer in a combat zone in the last five and half years from the National Guard. It is an insult to say that they don't have the potential to be a general officer. It is an insult to all of them.

I didn't ask General Sherrard, but I could, and I will: Did you feel qualified to be TRANSCOM commander at any time if you were asked? (Laughter.) If you were asked –

MR. SHERRARD: I probably should take the same approach as you've taken on this. It's probably inappropriate for me to discuss that at this point in time –

(Cross talk.)

MR. PUNARO: I certainly believe Commission Sherrard is qualified to be the TRANSCOM commander.

GEN. BLUM: If the secretary of the Air Force asked you to take TRANSCOM, would you tell them you weren't qualified?

MR. SHERRARD: No, I would not tell them that.

GEN. BLUM: No, I didn't think you would.

MR. SHERRARD: And I would tell you that – as a follow up to that, though, I would tell you that we have to be able to do the very things that you addressed in terms of joint training, joint experience, and joint educational opportunities for reserve members for which today there are none. As you mentioned, you have no positions identified as joint billets; nor do any of the other reserve components, to the best of my knowledge, and I think you can verify that for me if you would.

GEN. BLUM: That's actually true.

MR. PUNARO: Let me close out again on this operational because to have these 60,000 for a year, you're presuming you have the resources for the equipment, the resources for the people, and the resources for the training.

GEN. BLUM: Have to. You have to, Mr. Chairman. Without those things you can't generate that force.

MR. PUNARO: Right, so that's what brings you to the sustainability issue, in that right now without the fixes that are needed in all those areas, it can't be sustained. Is that correct?

GEN. BLUM: That's right.

MR. PUNARO: Yeah. Okay.

GEN. BLUM: I might point out that even as large as the defense budget is, we are spending less than half of the GDP percentage that we spent for Vietnam. And we're now talking about not an expeditionary venture in Southeast Asia; we're talking about defending our nation against an ideology that threatens our very existence. The American people cannot afford not to support an Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force that is required in this dangerous world.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, we've got about 15 or so minutes. I want to go around and see if any – who else might have an additional question.

MR. : No further questions.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Brownlee?

MR. BROWNLEE: General Blum, you mentioned – and, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned about resources, and a lot of this comes down to resources and the proportional allocation of that. You mentioned that you've got to be in a huddle, and I agree. Within the Army and the Air Force, if there's a huddle or if budget meetings where resources are divided up, if the chief of the Army National Guard is there, present at that meeting, do you consider that you're represented?

GEN. BLUM: Yes.

MR. BROWNLEE: Yes. And the same in the Air Force?

GEN. BLUM: Absolutely.

MR. PUNARO: Let's see, who – Commissioner Dawson, do you have anything? Mr. Eckles? Commissioner Keane.

MR. KEANE: Yes. General Blum, let me take you back to Katrina. Let's assume, as horrible as it is, that we may have another catastrophic event, whether it's from a natural disaster or an external force. And I think Katrina was a significant wakeup call to the nation, to local leaders, to national leaders, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, et cetera. And the event I'm describing is catastrophic in the sense that lives are at risk. People are in fact dying and the time to relieve that situation is precious. You know, you have 70 to 96 hours.

So to do that, the decision is made not only to activate Title 32 state forces and get them there as quickly as possible, but also, because of the emergency and the character and scale of it, to activate federal forces. And this took place in Katrina and it was – I think it was instructive to us because some of the problems it had when you bring both of these forces to the same place. So I've got a couple of questions surrounding this, and it has to do with unity of command, which gets you unity of effort. And you know as I do, being a military professional, how important the unity of effort is and the unity of command helps to drive that.

So when you have state and federal forces on the ground, trying to do complimentary things, who should they be working for?

GEN. BLUM: They should be working for the commander or the lawful civilian leader that's charged with the event, and if it's in a state and the state has not requested the federal government to wrest authority away from them, then the governor is the commander in chief of everybody that's responding, to including the federal civilian agencies that are sent by the president to help the governor, and all military uniformed people are there to support the lead federal or state agency. But the governor is – he or she is responsible for coordinating and leading that recovery effort.

So there is unity of command, even when you have parallel change of command in the military because the military is not in command of anything except themselves, and

they are in support of the civilian authorities, in this case, if it's in the United States, it's the governor.

MR. KEANE: I agree with that. I mean, so you don't see any difficulty that not only state forces reporting to the governor, but federal forces reporting to the governor, and those commanders taking direction from what the governor believes are the needs of their particular emergency?

GEN. BLUM: As long as everyone in uniform understands that it's not about who's in charge, it's what needs to be done and who is responsible to deliver that capability. We are there in support of the governor and the lead agency that is managing the event – you know, the incident commander.

MR. KEANE: (Unintelligible.)

GEN. BLUM: Then I don't – look, my son went there in Title 32. He rode on a Marine Reserve Title 10 amphibious vehicle all through St. Bernard's Parish with a sheriff from St. Bernard's Parish on that vehicle. So it was – he had a joint interagency operation going on and he didn't even know it, okay? (Laughter.) But he was there completely to support the sheriff and the Marines were there to support the National Guard being able to go in there and support the sheriff. And then when they were all finished and filthy from going through all that dank water, they went down to the port side and the Shreveport hosed them down, did their laundry, fed them and refurbished them with fuel and water. So the Navy was supporting the Marines and the National Guard, who were really all supporting St. Bernard's sheriff –

MR. KEANE: But let me ask you another question –

GEN. BLUM: – who were ultimately working for Governor Blanco.

MR. KEANE: That deals with operational control in terms of the groups of forces working for the state commander in chief, if you will. What about the tactical control? Now we've got units, as we did in New Orleans or, God forbid, another major city that's struck by a disaster, and at the tactical level, we've got Guard forces on the street and we've got federal forces on the street. And you and I both know that to make that work, they should have a boss, not multiple bosses. Is there something we can do to bring those state forces and federal forces under one commander, regardless of who that commander is – one commander? Whether it's state or federal I think should be somewhat irrelevant, but is there something we can do so that the orders and the execution of those orders are truly complimenting each other and we don't put those youngsters out there working for different people, possibly trying to achieve different objectives on our city streets, or wherever disaster would take them?

GEN. BLUM: Absolutely there is something – there's a couple ways we could do this. The one that would be most preferred by the governors and the adjutants general is have the Joint Force Headquarters, which the state already has in existence, be

augmented by whatever Title 10 experts need to come in and augment them – plug into a Joint Force Headquarters, just like we do overseas or anywhere that we operate. We pull in the multinational partners, interagency partners, people with expertise from either the maritime domain or the air domain. People that we don't traditionally have around the Joint Force Headquarters, you pull them in there. They would fall right in on there. There would be unity of command, there would be unity of effort, and what there wouldn't be is people out there worrying about am I Title 10 or are you Title 32? The only place that really matters is where you want to use people for law enforcement exclusively, and then when you're not doing law enforcement, if you're doing general purpose military support to civil authorities, then whether you're 32 or 10 shouldn't matter, and who's in charge really ought to be the Joint Force Headquarters if they're intact – if they're intact, if they're in being, and if they're capable. Absolutely that's the way I would do it. I would just pile in.

And if that becomes bigger than they can handle or you need to put some kind of regional control in there, then we go to a somewhat different construct. But if it's going to stay contained in the state, and the governor's in charge, he or she is going to want to work through their adjutant general, who is not the Joint Force Headquarters commander. He is basically acting like General Pace to the president at that point, or the SecDef, and then the Joint Taskforce commander, who has been to the Joint Task Force commanders course that now NORTHCOM runs for us, so that we get these people trained in advance and identified in advance – we now have 168 flag officers and colonels that have been through the Joint Task Force commanders course that NORTHCOM runs and JFCOMs run for us so that they're certified and they're trained to run a Joint Task Force in the United States – then if what we need is a chemical unit or a logistics unit or an aviation unit and that's the only Title 10 plug that's coming in there, it kind of doesn't make much sense to bring in a parallel change of command, bring in an active duty one, two, three, four-star to come in there and command something that would normally just plug in and be part of a Joint Task Force.

So if we're to the mature stage that you're describing, this is very easy. Now –

MR. KEANE: Do all the governors have these Joint Force Headquarters?

GEN. BLUM: Yes, sir, they do. There are 54 trained and ready Joint Force Headquarters in the country and it's taken us three and a half years to do that. You were there when we first started it.

MR. KEANE: Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner McKinnon.

MR. MCKINNON: General, just a couple thoughts here. We sort of recognized today that the American public really doesn't understand what this war is all about and

what the real threats from Islamic terrorism is all about. And you're sitting here testifying that you're below 50 percent equipped with first-class equipment domestically. And there's an old phrase of, there's no national security, there's no Social Security, which gets back to your comment about the need for GDP. The last figures I saw under the Kennedy administration, there was 9 percent GDP, and Reagan it was 6 percent, and now we're somewhere between 2.8 and 3.9, depending on whose figures you look at.

Where do you think, to adequately stand up the Guard with the kind of equipment that it needs, the GDP ought to be?

(Cross talk.)

GEN. BLUM: I don't know because the GDP – the Department of Defense – secretary of Defense would be much better prepared to do that, but I can tell you what my piece of it would look like to bring the national Army and Air Guard up to an acceptable level of readiness, and I'm talking about 80 percent of the equipment authorized on hand. It would cost \$40 billion – \$24 billion in the Army and about \$13.8 (billion) in the air.

The Air Guard, for the first time in 30 years, has 45 percent of its units less than C2. Think about that. That's unheard of.

MR. MCKINNON: From that standpoint, do you break out the equipment that's used for homeland security versus war fighting, from – (cross talk) – standpoint?

GEN. BLUM: Yes, I do. Yes, I do. And what I gave you is the whole thing. So if I took out the war fight thing, could it be reduced somewhat? Yes, it could.

MR. MCKINNON: Okay, and do you appear before the Congress to testify on this information?

GEN. BLUM: I have in closed hearing, yes, sir.

MR. MCKINNON: Okay, thank you.

MR. PUNARO: Anybody else?

MR. SHERRARD: I've got one if you don't mind.

MR. PUNARO: Mr. Sherrard.

MR. SHERRARD: Just one follow up, Steve, if I might. You do the coordination and facilitation of the various Guard organizations or Guard personnel as they support their states. And one of the things that's fuzzy in our minds, or is fuzzy in my mind, is the coordination within the Department of Army or Air Force, or with NORTHCOM as to what assets you've moved. How do you do that? Do you have people that – is that a chain that is open all the time as far as the notification, or is it

you're running it and as long as everything is going great, nobody cares about it and it's General Blum's problem? And I guess I'm –

GEN. BLUM: Well, I guess it could be that way, but we're trying to take it well beyond that.

MR. SHERRARD: Good.

GEN. BLUM: What we do is – there was about a 48 period where NORTHCOM, during Katrina, did not have visibility on what you describe to the extent that they would like. Since that time, by the third day, we were pushing twice a day and now it's once a day because we're not in a crisis mode. Every 24 hours, we update Northern Command on where every soldier is and where every piece of equipment is that is performing a mission, an operational mission that would be relevant to that combatant commander. In other words, they know our lay down on Operation Jumpstart on the border.

They know where the 1,100 people that are out this morning doing critical infrastructure and responding to weather emergencies around our nation, where they are, and they know where our fire fighting airplanes are when they're busy or they're being utilized. They know – when New York calls up, a couple hundred people to defend the subway threat, they know about that. They know where our CSTs are, and I sent them every day which ones are on strip alert, which we called a gold standard. That means they're ready to go now. We always have at least – at least a third of the force is ready to go now all around the country. They know which ones are on six-hour call and they know which ones are down for refit. They know where our 12 chemical, biological, nuclear and high-yield explosives and enhanced response force packages are around the country and what level they are, what level of readiness they are.

By the way, they're fully equipped, they're fully trained, and they're fully capable. We're growing to 17 and we keep them apprised of the progress of those 17. Every time a new CST gets certified, we tell them – we tell them that – we push it to them and push it to them until they say stop because we found to wait for the poll is too late.

MR. MCKINNON: Okay.

GEN. BLUM: And we have increased the number of people that are out there at NORTHCOM in their JOC to make sure that that gets into the current operations configuration and into the mix for the future operations or long range planning cell.

MR. PUNARO: A couple more. Commissioner Stockton.

MR. STOCKTON: General, you spent a year at NORTHCOM in its infancy.

GEN. BLUM: A little bit less but close to one.

MR. STOCKTON: Considering that the National Guard is one of the most important players for homeland defense and homeland security, which is under the command of the Northern Command. Would it make sense to significantly increase the numbers of personnel at NORTHCOM that have National Guard and Reserve experience?

GEN. BLUM: Absolutely.

MR. STOCKTON: Thank you, sir.

GEN. BLUM: Absolutely.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, General Blum, as we close out here, I want to thank you on behalf of all the commission for your straightforward testimony. I know all members found it compelling and persuasive. I'd also like to associate myself with your remarks that your colleagues – you took yourself out of this equation, but your colleagues, the Guard and Reserve leadership of the day, is fully qualified to serve at the general officer level. I am as convinced of that as you are, and I say that not just having watched it but with a number of members of our commissioners that spent the large part of my career working in the U.S. Senate looking at the confirmation of flag and general officers at all ranks over the years and understanding and having helped write some of the legislation, as did many of the other commissioners here.

So I don't say that from a base of just kind of off the top of my head, but having spent a lifetime looking at this, there's no doubt in my mind that your colleagues, as you indicated, are fully qualified to serve at the general officer level. And I'd like to add and associate myself with the remarks of Wes Brownlee; there's no question in my mind, you as an individual are absolutely, totally, fully qualified to serve at the general officer level, whether that be as the head of the National Guard Bureau or as the commander of the U.S. Northern Command. And so I think these are all things that we should take into consideration as we continue our deliberations. And I hope that you will, as you have been, keep your cell phone on because we'd like to stay in close touch with you over the next couple of days as we try to come up with our final recommendations.

And the bottom line is, Congress will be making the final decision on all these matters under the constitutional authorities they have to raise armies and maintain navies, and they're the ones that designate the positions in our military and determine whether people serve as four-star admirals and generals. So they'll be making the final call on all these –

GEN. BLUM: Mr. Chairman, I think – obviously you're correct on that, but I think they will welcome the experienced input of this –

MR. PUNARO: Well, no, we hope to – we will get our recommendations in on time on March the 1st. And the last thing I'd do is I'd ask you to leave your charts behind

if you don't need them for the rest of the day. We might find them useful with Secretary Harvey and General Pace.

So thank you again, General Blum, for your great service to this nation, and the leadership of our Guard –

GEN. BLUM: I'll do that. Thank you.

MR. PUNARO: – in a critical time. Thank you.

GEN. BLUM: Thank you.

MR. PUNARO: We'll stand in recess until 11:30 when we'll hear from the secretary of the Army, Fran Harvey.

(Sounds gavel.)

(End of first session.)